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Possession And PossessoRy Remedies  
in the dRAft of modificAtions  
to the civil code of RussiAn fedeRAtion  
in the miRRoR of JheRing’s doctRine  
of Possession
it is well known that the core idea behind Rudolf von Jhering’s doctrine of 
possession is that possession is an external manifestation of the right of ownership. 
therefore, as a matter of fact, possessory remedies are aimed at facilitating protec-
tion of the latter and not of the possession as such. The fact that in the final analysis 
possessory remedies could be applied for protection of a possessor in bad faith, even 
of a thief or an invader, was for Jhering an inevitable evil resulting from facilitating 
the proof of the right of ownership in this way. however, to his mind, negative 
aspects of such approach are compensated in practice to a very high degree by its 
advantages. 
At the same time, another distinguishing feature of Jhering’s conceptualisation 
of possession was its “spiritualization”, which differed much from the widespread 
tendency of its schematic vulgar generalization as an actual (physical) control over 
the object of possession. While demonstrating that aphoristic manner of description 
of doctrinal issues, which was characteristic of him, he wrote on the subject that the 
concept of actual possession of immovable property as a physical control of it “is 
the object of mockery for those rabbits, who are eating cabbage in my garden, and 
for children, who are wallowing in my haycocks”1.
* Professor Dr, Saint Petersburg State University.
1 R. von Jhering: The Reasons for Protection of Possession (in:) Selected Works, (Russian translation), vol. ii, 




the institute of possessory remedies is absent from the current provisions of 
the civil code of the Russian federation (hereinafter: cc Rf), which recognises 
only a petitory remedy for protection of the possessio ad usucapionem, comparable 
with the actio in rem Publiciana of Roman law2.
still, the possessory protection is inculcated in the relevant provisions of the 
concept of Development of civil Legislation of the Russian federation (hereinafter: 
concept), designed to become the basis for updating the cc Rf, as well as in its 
outcome: the Draft of Modifications to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation 
(hereinafter: Draft), which has been on the floor of the Russian Parliament starting 
from 2012 and has already been partly implemented. Both documents were deve-
loped by the Council for Codification and Improvement of Civil Legislation and the 
Research centre of Private law subordinate to the President of the Russian fede-
ration. 
in clause 1, Article 215 of the draft, entitled “the Right to Protection of Pos-
session”, it is stated that: “Any possessor — both rightful and unlawful — has the 
right to protection of his possession, regardless of whether it belongs to him in re-
spect of the object of possession right to property, including in the content of the 
power of possession”. 
Although this point is declared the universal protection of possession, it is 
unclear for whom it may in fact be necessary. 
it is obvious that in the presence of the presumption of rightfulness of any 
possession (“Possession shall be recognized as rightful so long as the court does not 
set otherwise”) in section , Article 212 of the draft, possessory protection as such 
may become necessary only to an unlawful possessor in a situation where the vio-
lator of his possession is able to rebut the said presumption, i.e. when the violator 
is the owner or another title holder. 
in any other case, relying on that presumption any possessor has the right to 
apply the vindication (rei vindicatio) thus avoiding the application of the possesso-
ry suit. 
in other words, while in Jhering’s conceptualisation of possessory protection 
as the advanced level of the right of ownership the fact that it could be used by 
possessors in bad faith against the owners has always been perceived as a necessa-
ry evil, whose existence is tolerated only insofar as the undoubted benefits of this 
2 clause 2 Article 2 cc Rf: until the right of ownership to the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription 
is acquired, a person possessing property as his own has the right to protection of his possession against third 
persons who are neither owners of the property nor have the right of possession by virtue of another basis pro-
vided by a statute or a contract. see on this in: A. Rudokvas: azione publiciana nel diritto civile russo vigente, 
Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Iurisprudentia 2007, No. 2, pp. 211–214.
 The concept of Development of civil Legislation of the Russian federation, Statut, Moscow 2009, pp. 72–75.
 Draft No. 47538–6/10 “About introduction of modifications into first and second parts of the Civil Code of 
the Russian Federation and into some legislative acts of the Russian Federation”, available at: http://asozd2.duma.
gov.ru/main.nsf/(Spravka)?OpenAgent&RN=47538–6.
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institute for the rule of law generally outweigh its downsides, in the proposed na-
tional model possessory protection from the very beginning is seen as a special 
means of protecting unlawful possessors against the owners. 
it is noteworthy that paragraph 1, clause , Article 22 of the same draft offers 
the non-proliferation of the limitation of actions on the vindication, so that the loss 
of the right to the vindication occurred only simultaneously with the loss of the right 
of ownership due to the expiry of the acquisitive prescription on the side of the third 
person — possessor ad usucapionem — resulting in acquisition of the right of owner-
ship by the latter. 
nevertheless, it is worth noting that almost the only practical example, which 
led supporters of the implementation of the fundamentalist models of possessory 
protection in the Russian legislation, was that in the absence of the possessory re-
medies in the positive law an unlawful possessor remains unprotected against the 
owner, who has fallen in the situation named dominium sine re, that is when he has 
lost the hope of vindication of his property after the expiry of the limitation period 
of this action, but continues to be the property’s owner. the question why in such 
a situation the possessor in bad faith should be protected against the owner remains 
unanswered. 
in clause 2, Article 215 of the draft stipulates: “the protection of possession 
may be undertaken by the possessor himself (self-defence) or by recourse to public 
authorities (courts, executive bodies, etc.)”. in other words, this provision allows 
the arbitrariness aimed at return of the lost property without application to the juris-
dictional or other authorised state bodies. 
this model of possessory protection, permitting and authorising arbitrary re-
covery of possession by the previous possessor from the intruder, appearing first in 
the classical Roman law, is implemented at present in germany. 
For that, the relevant provisions of §§ 861–862 of the German Civil Code 
(Bürgerliches gesetzbuch, hereinafter: BgB) at the time of the latter’s promulgation 
were harshly criticised by a Russian professor in Roman law, iosif Alexeevich Po-
krovsky, as encouraging arbitrariness5. 
At the same time, in accordance with clause  of the same article of the draft, 
“protection of possession can be done by appealing to the executive authorities in 
the cases provided for by law. thus, the actions of the executive authorities should 
be focused exclusively on the return of property to the person who lost it”. 
here, the authors of the draft explicitly tried to combine in it all the mutually 
exclusive positions, expressed in regard to possessory remedies in the Russian ci-
vilian literature. In particular, the provision under discussion reflects the position 
upholding the irrelevance of the jurisdictional possessory remedies in the presence 
5 i.A. Pokrovsky: main Issues of Possession in the new german civil code, (in Russian), Vestnik Prava 1899, 
Book 1, pp. 92–120.
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of effective administrative methods of protection of possession comparable with the 
interdictum of praetor in the classical Roman law. the draft proposes such admi-
nistrative remedy as an alternative (along with self-defence). But for this purpose, 
in addition to the amendments to the cc Rf, the establishment of appropriate legal 
mechanisms would be required, which we lack in the currently binding Russian law. 
By virtue of clause 1, Article 216 of the draft, “the court should answer to the 
claim for protection of possession, if it is established that the possessor has been 
deprived of an object of possession against his will that is by the spoliation exerci-
sed by another person”. 
this draws attention to incorrectness of equating the deprivation of possession 
against one’s will and its spoliation. After all, the possession can also be lost or 
transferred for a deal with the vices of will. 
here, the authors of the draft apparently stipulate not by chance that “the 
possessor has been deprived of an object of possession”, instead of stating that he 
has lost his possession. The point is that the drafters previously defined in paragraph 3, 
clause 1, Article 209 of the draft that “in order to protect violated possession, it is 
not considered lost if the person in the prescribed manner has availed himself of the 
protection of possession”. 
in other words, one can actually lose the object of possession, but remain its 
possessor from a legal point of view. 
the above-mentioned dichotomy forced the authors of the draft to speak he-
reinafter about the defendant in a possessory claim not as of the possessor but as of 
“the person who actually possesses the object of possession”, while the possessor 
from a legal point of view, at least within a year from the date of deprivation of 
possession (which is a limitation period for the possessory suit), remains the one 
who has been deprived of the actual possession (domination) of the thing. it remains 
a mystery how this construction relates to the fact that under Article 209 of the draft 
possession is defined as “actual domination”. 
“unless otherwise provided by law, the claim for protection of possession is 
filed by the person who possessed the object of possession until the intrusion giving 
rise to the respective claim” (clause 2, article 216 of the draft). 
in other words, the law under certain circumstances envisages a possibility to 
claim the possession which has been taken from a person another than the claimant. 
the question of passive legitimisation for possessory claims is resolved here 
as follows: “the claim for protection of possession shall apply to the person who 
actually possesses the object of possession after the intrusion which constituted the 
grounds to advance the corresponding claim” (clause , Article 216 of the draft). 
thus, the possessory action is brought against any person, regardless of his aware-
ness of the fact of the spoliation of possession from the previous possessor. 
It is pertinent to note in this regard that, as a doctrinal justification for posses-
sory protection in the concept of Development of the Legislation on the Real Rights, 
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which became preliminary version of the corresponding parts of the concept of 
Development of civil Legislation of the Russian federation, one can find a link to 
Jhering’s doctrine, according to which possessory protection is necessary in order 
to avoid difficulties with proof of ownership in case of intrusion by third parties of 
the owner’s sphere of economic domination6. 
At the same time, the preliminary concept also cited the words of Pokrovsky, 
who — following friedrich carl von savigny — insisted that the “protection of 
possession is the culmination of the idea of the protection of an individual”7.
However, in the final variant of the Concept it remains only to mention that 
“the purpose of possessory protection is the fight against violent acts of arbitrari-
ness”8. 
After a careful reading, it becomes clear that Jhering’s idea was mentioned in 
the concept rather for completeness, and introducing of possessory protection into 
Russian law is not based on his theory of the grounds of protection of possession. 
in particular, this is evidenced by the statement of the above-discussed concept 
that as long as the possession is not recognized as a subjective right, it is possible 
possession (and hence application of possessory remedies) in respect of assets wit-
hdrawn from civil turnover (res extra commercium) or those items which in princi-
ple do not meet the characteristics applied to the object of rights. in other words, the 
matter concerns situations when the protection of possession cannot be considered 
a protection of the presumed ownership, which was a crucial point for Jhering’s 
theory of the protection of possession. 
This idea of the Concept was reflected in clauses 2–4, Article 211 of the 
draft. 
thus, the guiding idea behind the introduction of this section to the concept 
and to the draft was that of the protection of the individual. due to the fact that its 
connection with possessory remedies as such is not obvious and is to some extent 
declarative, the idea clearly requires explanation. it was born at the very beginning 
of the Pandect law doctrinal development. A theoretical generalisation of the casu-
istry of the sources of Roman law made by savigny led him to a conclusion that 
“the institute of possession belongs to the law of obligations” (der Besitz in das 
obligationenrecht gehört). therefore, savigny insisted that “one who generally 
divides property rights into real rights and rights under the law of obligations, for 
this reason alone, should separate possession from any real right”9.
This only at first glance may seem paradoxical. In fact, its logic is transparent 
and flawless. Possession is protected as such, regardless of its legality. Therefore, 
6 The concept of Development of the Legislation on the Real Rights, (in Russian), vestnik vysshego Arbitra-
zhnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2009, No. 4, p. 72.
7 Ibidem.
8 The concept of Development of civil Legislation…, op. cit., p. 72.
9 f.c. von savigny: Das Recht des Besitzes, 5 Aufl., Gießen 1827, p. 31.
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possessory protection can be claimed both by a thief, and by the owner. conseque-
ntly, there can be no question of protection of the right of ownership. however, 
because the intrusion of possession takes place against the will of the possessor, it 
is a kind of assault on his person, violence over his will. hence, demanding the 
restoration of the status quo, that is the return to the possessor of the actual posses-
sion of a thing or of the termination of encroachment on possession carried out in 
another form, is a measure of responsibility for that outrage on the person. 
the institute of possessory protection is designed to protect not the possession 
as a property right (which is not such), but the moral good — the dignity of the 
person, which is not a subjective right, either. in other words, the right of possession 
(ius possessionis) occurs only as an element of the content of the protective legal 
relationship that arises from the legal fact of encroachment on the personal dignity 
of the possessor, implemented in the form of a violation of his possession. therefo-
re, it is tortious in its nature, representing the right to end the intrusion to possession 
addressed to the intruder. 
in this aspect, savigny had even nothing against innovations implemented in 
usus modernus Pandectarum by the canon law, which extended the scope of pos-
sessory claims against third parties — defaulting purchasers who should be recog-
nized as complicit violators of possession10. in any case, the possessory claim mo-
dernised by canonists still fell within the ranges of the doctrinal scheme, elaborated 
by savigny.
georg friedrich Puchta changed slightly savigny’s concept, recognizing the 
dignity as a special kind of inalienable subjective right. he wrote: “Personality, how 
the person independently understands and protects her, is in itself right. it is joined 
by another right arising from the activities of individuals, aimed at the outside world, 
the discipline of things. this submission appears to be only factual in the form of 
possession. But this actual attitude of a person to things already receives legal sig-
nificance as a result of the person possessing. Such is the nature of the right of 
possession”11.
Puchta did not consider the possession as such to be a right, and believed that 
“possession, by itself, has no characteristics of a right, and must borrow them from 
any other rights, under the safeguard of which it comes”12, so that “the right of pos-
session is a right to own personality”1. under this doctrine, the object of protection 
was a regulatory right to own personality (Recht an der eigenen Person). the right 
of possession as the right to claim restoration of the status quo that has existed be-
fore the intrusion, after all, appeared only as an element of the content of the pro-
10 u. Wolter: Ius canonicum in Iure civili: Studien zur Rechtsquellenlehre in der neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte, 
Köln–Vienna 1975, p. 185.
11 g.f. Puchta: course of Roman civil Law, (Russian Translation), Vol. I, Moscow 1874, p. 125.
12 Ibidem, p. 21.
1 Ibidem, p. 22.
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tective legal relation, generated by the fact of the violation of this right to own perso-
nality. one should emphasize that both Puchta and savigny distinguished the posses-
sio ad usucapionem, protected by the actio in rem Publiciana as a property right, from 
the mere possession protected by possessory remedies as an actual state1. 
Jhering, opposing the doctrines of savigny and Puchta, denied tortious nature 
of possessory claims because the spoliation is not always related to the guilt of 
violence exercised against the person of the possessor. however, he admitted: “pos-
sessory interdicts are not against the third possessor, but only against someone who 
took away from us the possession, directly or contesting it from us — in other words, 
the relief of proof […] consisting in fact that without proof of his ownership (the 
claimant) can confine himself with proof of probability of the right on his side, 
requires a certain motive arising from the person of the adversary. in case of violation 
of possession this motive consists in the crime, which the defendant committed, but 
the possessory claim would be already out of place against the third person, which 
acquired possession from the invader, and (the victim) needs to apply vindication 
or actio in rem Publiciana”15.
the authors of the concept went their own way, stating that “the protection 
of possession is claimed against the violator of possession or any subsequent pos-
sessor”. thus, the Russian legislator is going to promote the idea peculiar to a spe-
cific possessory suit of Medieval law, the actio spolii. in some periods and in some 
regions of Western europe, the claim in the form of the condictio ex canone redin-
tegranda applied against any subsequent possessor, regardless of his awareness of 
the fact of deprivation of possession of someone of the previous possessors against 
the latter’s will16. the construction of the claim was based on the idea that the loss 
of possession against the possessor’s will is an objective “defect of thing” (vitium 
rei), which is detractive for all subsequent possessions17. 
However, in the era of modern codifications this design was rejected. In the 
civil codes of the european countries the defendant for the possessory claim can be 
only that subsequent possessor who acquired possession, knowing about its spolia-
tion from a third person18. A dogmatic justification of this design is an old theory of 
canon law, according to which such subsequent acquirer of possession is complicit 
1 Ibidem, p. 347.
15 R. von Jhering: The Reasons…, op. cit., p. 50.
16 s.P. nikonov: evolution of the Protection of Possession in the medieval europe, (in Russian), kharkov 1905, 
pp. 134, 137, 144, 182 ff.
17 F. Ruffini: L’actio spolii. Studio storico-giuridico, Roma 1972, p. 373.
18 BGB § 858 unlawful interference with possession: (1) A person who, against the will of the possessor, de-
prives the possessor of possession or interferes with the possessor’s possession acts, except where the deprivation 
or the interference is permitted by law, acts unlawfully (unlawful interference with possession). (2) the possession 
obtained as a result of unlawful interference is defective. the successor in possession must allow the defectiveness 
to be asserted against him if he is the heir of the possessor or he knows when he acquires possession that the pos-
session of his predecessor was defective.
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in the spoliation of possession19. it should be admitted that even this doctrine is 
questionable, if one looks at it through the prism of the notion of complicity in the 
crime developed in the criminal law. it should be remembered that robbery or theft, 
on the one hand, and buying stolen goods on the other, represent different offences. 
Nevertheless, the discussed theory gives at least some plausible justification 
for a passive legitimation of the possessory claim addressed to a subsequent posses-
sor. yet the problem of how it could be possible dogmatically to provide the passive 
legitimation of such claim for any subsequent possessor remains unresolved, and 
the resolution of this issue is not provided by the authors of the draft, neither in their 
concept nor in any other sources. 
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A core idea behind Rudolf von Jhering’s doctrine of possession is that possession is an 
external manifestation of the right of ownership. therefore, as a matter of fact, possessory 
remedies are aimed at facilitating protection of the latter and not of the possession as such. 
The fact that in the final analysis possessory remedies could be applied for protection of 
a possessor in bad faith, even of a thief or an invader, was for Jhering an inevitable evil 
resulting from facilitating the proof of the right of ownership in this way. however, to his 
mind, negative aspects of such approach are to a very high degree compensated in practice 
by its advantages. At the same time, another distinguishing feature of the Jhering’s concep-
tualisation of possession was its “spiritualization”, which differed much from the widespread 
tendency of its schematic vulgar generalisation as an actual (physical) control over the object 
of possession. the institute of possessory remedies is lacking under the currently binding 
provisions of the civil code of the Russian federation, which recognises only a petitory 
remedy for protection of the possessio ad usucapionem, comparable with the actio in rem 
Publiciana of the Roman law (clause 2, Article 2 cc Rf). still, the possessory remedies 
are inculcated in the relevant provisions of the concept of Development of civil Legislation 
of the Russian federation designed to become the basis for updating the cc Rf, as well as 
in its outcome: the Draft of Modifications to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, which 
has been on the floor of the Russian Parliament starting from 2012 and has already been 
partly implemented. despite of the fact that the drafters referred, inter alia, to the ideas of 
Jhering to be a source of their inspiration, they are evidently going to promote the idea 
peculiar to a specific possessory suit of Medieval Western law, the actio spolii, in the form 
of the what is referred to condictio ex canone redintegranda. such conceptualisation of the 
possessory remedies seems to be rather far from Jhering’s doctrine.
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